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KATHERINE BIRMINGHAM WILMORE, GLENN P. HENDRIX, AND N. JANSEN CALAMITA*
I. The Act of State Doctrine
The act of state doctrine precludes U.S. courts from inquiring into the validity of public
acts undertaken by a "recognized foreign sovereign power committed within its own ter-
ritory,"1 leaving challenges to the validity of such acts to the political branches of the U.S.
government.' This judicially-created doctrine constitutes a prudential limitation on the
exercise of a court's power. It is neither jurisdictionally nor constitutionally mandated, but
rather formed by policies of international comity and domestic separation of powers with
regard to foreign relations.3
A. CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AND SEPARATION OF POWERS
The act of state doctrine arose in an unusual context in the District Court for the District
of Columbia in 2004. It was raised by the Justice Department in Abu Ali v. Ashcroft.4 Abu
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1. Banco National de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 401 (1964).
2. See WS. Kirkpatrick & Co. v. Envtl. Tectonics Corp., 493 U.S. 400, 404 (1990).
3. See Banco Nacional de Cuba, 376 U.S. at 428.
4. Abu Ali v. Ashcroft, 350 E Supp. 2d 28 (D.D.C. 2004).
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Ali had filed a petition of habeas corpus against Attorney General Ashcroft, challenging his
detention in Saudi Arabia, "allegedly at the behest and ongoing supervision of the United
States."' In his habeas petition, Abu Ali alleged that the United States had initiated and
orchestrated his arrest while he was attending university in Saudi Arabia. The United States
filed a motion to dismiss, asserting that the court had no jurisdiction to consider the petition
on the basis of act of state, separation of powers, and political question doctrines.6 With
respect to the act of state doctrine, the United States alleged that the habeas petition called
into question the motivations of the Saudi government in detaining Abu Ali and implied
that the Saudi government was acting as a "puppet" of the United States.7
The district court denied the motion to dismiss, holding that the United States may not
avoid the habeas jurisdiction of federal courts by enlisting a foreign sovereign as an inter-
mediary to detain a U.S. citizen.' The court cited to the Supreme Court's decision in
Karkpatrick for the general principle that the act of state doctrine applies only where the
acts of a foreign sovereign would be invalidated, not merely impugned or a cause for em-
barrassment.9 In rejecting the act of state defense raised by the United States, the district
court quoted at some length from the Ramirez de Arellano'0 decision of the D.C. Circuit,
which stated that
[t]he Supreme Court has never applied the act of state doctrine to bar adjudication of consti-
tutional claims by a United States citizen against officials of the United States government....
It is highly questionable whether officials of the Executive are entided to raise the act of state
defense to prevent the Judiciary from exercising its role in the tripartite system of government
to remedy injuries to United States citizens caused by unconstitutional activities of the United
States Executive Branch. A teaming up with foreign agents cannot exculpate officials of the
United States from liability to United States citizens for the United States officials' unlawful
acts .... II
B. IMPLICATIONS FOR FOREIGN RELATIONS
In 2004, several courts addressed the appropriate scope of state action under the act of
state doctrine. In United States v. Giffen,"2 the defendant, James Giffen, was indicted for
allegedly making unlawful payments to senior Kazakh officials to obtain business for his
New York-based company. Giffen raised the act of state doctrine as a defense to his in-
dictment, asserting that he held a semi-official position in the Kazakh government as coun-
selor to the president of Kazakhstan and that the activities charged in the indictment were
all performed in his capacity as an agent of the Kazakh government. The District Court
for the Southern District of New York found that the act of state doctrine did not prohibit
the court from considering the legality of Giffen's acts because the payments involved
commercial transactions among foreign corporations and occurred outside of Kazakhstan.
5. Id. at 30.
6. Id. at 31.
7. Id. at 58.
8. Id. at 41.
9. See WS. Kirkpatrick & Co., 493 U.S. at 407-10.
10. Ramirez de Arellano v. Weinberger, 745 F.2d 1500, 1506-09 (D.C. Cir. 1984), rev'd on other grounds, 471
U.S. 1113 (1985).
11. Id. at 1542-43 (emphasis in original).
12. United States v. Giffen, 326 F Supp. 2d 497 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
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The court also rejected Giffen's arguments that the prosecution would intrude upon the
executive branch's power over foreign affairs or result in political embarrassment, reasoning
that the executive branch's direct involvement in the prosecution of Giffen would avoid
any separation of powers concerns. 3
In Doe I v. Liu Qi,14 the Northern District of California addressed the applicability of the
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) and the act of state doctrine to a cause of action
brought by plaintiffs, supporters of Falun Gong, alleging that local Chinese officials had
authorized and committed abuses against them. The magistrate judge determined that the
officials were not immune from suit under the FSIA because their alleged conduct was
inconsistent with Chinese law and, therefore, did not constitute protected acts under the
FSIA. But the magistrate found that the act of state doctrine barred plaintiffs' claims for
damages and injunctive relief but not their claim for declaratory relief. The court reasoned
that in the case of declaratory relief, the risk of interfering with the executive branch was
minimal. 5
C. INTANGIBLE PROPERTY AND TERRITORIALITY
In Films by Jove v. Berov,16 the District Court for the Eastern District of New York
declined to apply the act of state doctrine to an alleged expropriation of intangible property
located outside of the foreign sovereign state. The case involved a copyright dispute be-
tween plaintiffs, holders of an exclusive copyright license, and defendants, individuals claim-
ing to have valid rights in the copyrighted materials. The parties disputed whether a Russian
Federal directive asserting state ownership of the copyrights constituted a basis for recon-
sideration of the prior court's judgment ruling in favor of plaintiffs. The court held that
the act of state doctrine did not require recognition of the directive because the obligations
under the license arose in the United States, not in the Russian Federation. In reaching its
decision, the court reiterated the principle that the act of state doctrine does not extend to
takings of property located outside the territory of the acting state at the time of the taking,
even if the property belonged to an enterprise based in that state. 7
II. Immunities Act: Recent Developments in the Law
Under the FSIA'1 foreign sovereigns are deemed immune from suit in U.S. courts unless
one of the enumerated exceptions to immunity applies.19 Noteworthy developments in 2004
related to the international takings, terrorism, and commercial activity exceptions; the con-
flict between international agreements and the FSIA; and circumstances under which a
foreign sovereign's property can be attached. The most important FSIA case of the year
was Republic of Austria v. Altmann,20 an international takings case in which the Supreme
13. Id. at 502.
14. Doe I v. Liu Qi, 349 E Supp. 2d 1258 (N.D. Cal. 2004).
15. Id. at 1306.
16. Films by Jove, Inc. v. Berov, 341 E Supp. 2d 199 (E.D.N.Y. 2004).
17. Id. at 207; see also Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682 (1976).
18. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602-11 (1976).
19. Id. §§ 1604-1607.
20. Republic of Austria v. Altmann, 541 U.S. 677 (2004).
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Court held that the FSIA applies retroactively and permits suits for conduct that predates
its enactment.
A. ALTMANN AND THE INTERNATIONAL TAKINGS EXCEPTION2"
During the Second World War, the Nazis seized a collection of paintings by Gustav
Klimt, now worth $100 million, that were owned by the plaintiff's aunt and uncle. Those
paintings eventually found their way into Austrian museums. After repeated failed attempts
to recover the paintings in Austria, the plaintiff sued in California under the FSIA's inter-
national takings exception. Austria contended that it was absolutely immune to suit because
all its alleged conduct occurred no later than 1948, well before the FSIA's exceptions were
enacted in 1976.
In its opinion, the Supreme Court began by placing the retroactivity inquiry in historical
context. In 1952, the State Department issued the Tate Letter,22 which adopted a restrictive
theory of sovereign immunity, whereby the United States would no longer recognize ab-
solute sovereign immunity for those acts where a foreign sovereign effectively acted in a
private capacity.23 The restrictive approach to sovereign immunity was codified in 1976 by
the FSIA. The Court concluded that its usual analysis for determining when a statute should
apply retroactively-where it only affects procedure, but not where it affects substantive
rights-was inadequate in the case of the FSIA.24 Instead, the Court looked to the purposes
of limiting retroactivity. The normal presumption against retroactivity was to protect pri-
vate parties' rights and reasonable expectations. But, as the Court, noted, "the principal
purpose of foreign sovereign immunity has never been to permit foreign states and their
instrumentalities to shape their conduct in reliance on the promise of future immunity from
suit in United States courts. 25 The extent of immunity reflects political realities and issues
of comity. The Tate Letter, which the State Department had already applied retroactively,
supported the Court's conclusion that the FSIA was intended to apply retroactively.16 The
Court found further support for its position in the language of the FSIA and in Congress'
objective to clarify the manner in which the judiciary would determine the reach of sov-
ereign immunity. 7
Subsequently, the Second Circuit applied Altmann in Abrams v. Societe Nationale des Chem-
ins de Fer Francais,2s a case in which the plaintiffs attempted to recover for Holocaust-related
crimes from the French National Railway (SNCF), an instrumentality of France that was
held privately during the Second World War. The court found its hands tied. It could no
longer consider the State Department's historical approach because Congress, as Altmann
holds, had made clear that the FSIA is the current expression of the U.S. approach to
21. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(3).
22. Letter from Jack B. Tate, Acting Legal Advisor, U.S. Dept. of State, to Acting U.S. Attorney General
Philip B. Perlman (May 19, 1952), reprinted in 26 Dept. of State Bull. 984-85 (1952) and Alfred Dunhill, supra
note 17 at Appendix 2.
23. Altmann, 541 U.S. at 677.
24. Id. at 694.
25. Id. at 696.
26. Id. at 696, n.16.
27. Id. at 696-99.
28. Abrams v. Societe Nationale des chemins de Fer Francais, 389 E3d 61 (2d Cir. 2004).
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sovereign immunity. Citing an earlier Supreme Court case, Dole Food Co. v. Patrickson,2 9 the
court concluded that whether SNCF was privately held during the Second World War was
irrelevant; it was a government instrumentality at the time of suit and therefore presump-
tively immune. 0
B. THE TERRORISM EXCEPTION 3 '
In Cicippio-Puleo v. Islamic Republic of Iran,32 the D.C. Circuit addressed whether the
terrorism exception to sovereign immunity grants a private right of action either by itself
or in concert with the Flatow Amendment, which provides a private right of action against
officials, employees or agents of state sponsors of terrorism but not against a state itself.3
The court quickly concluded that the terrorism exception by itself was jurisdictional only1
4
The court then evaluated whether there was any way to read the terrorism exception and
the Flatow Amendment together as granting a private cause of action against state sponsors
of terrorism. It concluded there was not a private cause of action because the language of
the amendment was unambiguous in excluding states, and because settled Supreme Court
doctrine made clear that "[i]t cannot be assumed that a claimant has a cause of action...
against a government agency merely because there has been a waiver of sovereign im-
munity ..."I'
In Price v. Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya,36 the D.C. Circuit revisited a case it
had remanded in 2002 for the purpose of allowing the plaintiffs to amend their complaint
to add the details of their alleged torture. After plaintiffs amended their complaint, the
district court denied Libya's renewed motion to dismiss. On appeal to the D.C. Circuit,
Libya argued that inconsistencies between the plaintiffs' deposition testimony in a related
New York suit and their allegations in the amended complaint, undermined the district
court's finding of jurisdiction. The D.C. Circuit found that when a foreign sovereign dis-
putes the facts on a motion to dismiss for FSIA, the court must go beyond the pleadings.3 7
It remains, however, the sovereign's burden to "prov[e] that the plaintiff's allegations do
not bring its case within a statutory exception to immunity."38 The Court of Appeals found
the apparent incongruities minor, even reconcilable, particularly given the long time that
had passed since the events alleged in the complaint, and concluded that Libya had "not
identified any true contradictions to undermine the credibility of the amended complaint"
and thus failed to meet its burden. 9 More interestingly, Libya urged the court to exercise
pendent appellate jurisdiction over the non-immunity related issue of whether the plaintiffs
had a cause of action under the Flatow Amendment in light of the D.C. Circuit's earlier
decision in Cicippio-Puleo. The court refused to do so, as the issue was entirely separate
29. Dole Food Co. v. Patrickson, 538 U.S. 468 (2003).
30. Abrams, 389 F3d at 63-64.
31. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(7).
32. Cicippio-Puleo v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 353 F.3d 1024 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
33. Id. at 1026-27.
34. Id. at 1032.
35. Id. at 1033.
36. Price v. Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 389 F.3d 192 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
37. Id. at 197.
38. Id. at 198.
39. Id. at 198.
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from the FSIA jurisdictional question and interlocutory appeal from the district court's
decision on the motion to dismiss was not available. 4°
C. THE COMMERCIAL ACTIvITY EXCEPTION"
The Second Circuit decided in Kato v. Isbibara42 that a government instrumentality en-
gaged in the promotion of commerce is not "thereby engaged in commerce. The promotion
abroad of the commerce of domestic firms is a basic-even quintessential-governmental
function."43 The plaintiff, a Japanese civil servant working for an instrumentality of Japan
in New York, sued her employer for sexual harassment while she was in New York and
retaliation when she returned to Japan. The district court decided, based on legislative
history, that the employment of civil servants was clear government action, and thus the
defendants had immunity. The Second Circuit affirmed on different grounds. It evaluated
the nature of the conduct of the instrumentality and concluded that, while superficially the
defendants' marketing and promotion efforts appeared commercial, they provided general
promotional and business assistance for Japanese companies in a manner that would have
been unusual for a non-governmental entity.-
D. CONFLICTS WITH INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS
The Ninth Circuit decided Moore v. United Kingdom,4 a case in which the NATO-Status
of Forces Agreement (NATO-SOFA) came into conflict with the FSIA. The case arose
out of a bar fight between several British military personnel and an American citizen in
Washington State. The American plaintiff sued the United Kingdom under FSIA's non-
commercial tort exception. 46 The United States filed an application for leave to appear as
amicus curiae at the district court, together with a "Suggestion of Lack of Subject Matter
Jurisdiction" explaining that plaintiff's litigation against defendants who were active duty
British servicemen in the United States was governed and barred by the NATO-SOFA, an
international agreement which predated the FSIA. The district court dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit, in case of first impression, looked to § 1604 of
the FSIA47 to assess the interplay between the FSIA and treaties to decide whether inter-
national agreements were intended to restrict even the enumerated exceptions to sovereign
immunity.4 Section 1604 of the FSIA provides: "[s]ubject to existing international agree-
ments to which the United States is a party at the time of enactment of [the FSIA] a foreign
state shall be immune from the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States and of the
States except as provided [by the enumerated exceptions]." 49 The court held that legislative
history clarified Congress's intent to subordinate the FSIA, including its exceptions to ex-
40. Id. at 199-200.
41. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (2002).
42. Kato v. Ishihara, 360 E3d 106 (2d Cir. 2004).
43. Id. at 112.
44. Id. at 111-12.
45. Moore v. United Kingdom, 384 F.3d 1079 (9th Cir. 2004).
46. Id. at 1081.
47. 28 U.S.C. § 1604 (2005).
48. Moore, 384 F.3d at 1084.
49. Id. at 1084.
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isting treaties, and the court accordingly found that NATO-SOFA precluded jurisdiction
under the FSIA. s°
E. ATTACHMENT 5
In Walker International Holdings Ltd. v. Republic of Congo, 2 the Fifth Circuit considered
whether moneys owed by a foreign sovereign's debtor could be attached on the basis of the
commercial activity exception.53 The plaintiff was awarded a large sum of money from the
Congo in an arbitration proceeding before the International Chamber of Commerce and
sought to collect by filing a garnishment action on funds not yet paid by one of the Congo's
U.S. debtors. The court first went through the steps of finding that (1) the Congo had
waived sovereign immunity and (2) the debt was present in the United States.54 The court
then addressed whether the property the plaintiff sought to attach had been used for com-
mercial activity in the United States. The court stated the rule that even if the money at
issue had been generated by commercial activity in the United States, it may not be attached
if it had not been "used for" commercial activity in the United States." The court con-
cluded, because "there was no commercial activity separate from the transaction that gen-
erated the property in the first place," the funds were immune from attachment.5
6
m. Developments in the Doctrine of Forum Non
Conveniens
The common law doctrine offorum non conveniens allows dismissal of a case even though
a court has subject matter jurisdiction, personal jurisdiction, and proper venue, provided
there is another court which is "available" and "adequate" that would also be more "con-
venient" or better serve the interests of justice." Theforum non conveniens balances a series
of private and public interest factors (collectively referred to as the Gilbert factors) against
the deference accorded the plaintiff's forum selection.55
In the Second Circuit case of Base Metal Trading SA v. Russian Aluminum,"9 the plaintiffs
alleged that the defendants had engaged in a massive conspiracy to take over Russia's largest
producers of aluminum and vanadium in the mid-1990's through sham bankruptcy pro-
ceedings, bribery of Russian political officials, judicial corruption, and the use of armed
force. Defendants moved to dismiss, partly on the basis of forum non conveniens. In perform-
ing its forum non conveniens analysis, the district court first ruled that the plaintiffs were
50. Id. at 1088.
51. 28 U.S.C. § 1610.
52. Walker Int'l Holdings Ltd. v. Republic of Congo, 395 E3d 229 (5th Cir. 2004).
53. 28 U.S.C. § 1610(a).
54. Walker Int'l Holdings Ltd., 395 F3d at 233-36.
55. Id. at 235-36.
56. Id. at 236.
57. Koster v. (Am.) Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 330 U.S. 518, 527 (1947).
58. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 508 (1947); see also Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235
(1981).
59. Base Metal Trading S.A. v. Russian Aluminum, 253 E Supp. 2d 681 (S.D.N.Y. 2003), affd, Base Metal
Trading Ltd. v. Russian Aluminum, No. 03-7466, 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 8547 (2d Cir. Apr. 30,2004). Seealso
Archangel Diamond Corp. v. Arkhangelskgeoldobycha, 94 P.3d 1208 (Colo. Ct. App. 2004).
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forum shopping, and hence that their choice of a New York forum was entitled to little
weight. Next, the court determined that the Russian courts were both available and adequate
as an alternative forum, by deciding that Russian law provided relief for the plaintiffs' claims,
rejecting the generalized attack on the Russian judicial system, and finding the plaintiffs'
showing of corruption in the specific underlying Russian bankruptcy proceedings insuffi-
cient. The court then determined that the Gilbert private and public interest factors tilted
in favor of adjudication in Russia. The Second Circuit affirmed.
Base Metal served as a precedent to its companion case, Norex Petroleum Ltd. v. Access
Industries Inc.,60 in which the Southern District of New York similarly found Russia to be a
more appropriate forum and dismissed on the ground of forum non conveniens. In Norex,
plaintiff contested the adequacy of the Russian alternative forum by arguing that (1) Russian
law does not provide a cause of action similar to the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act (RICO); (2) Russian Court procedures are inadequate; and (3) the entire
Russian judicial system suffers from endemic corruption. After determining that the foreign
plaintiff's choice of forum did not deserve substantial deference, the district court carefully
considered the adequate alternative forum issues. Relying upon affidavits concerning Rus-
sian law, the court determined that although Russia did not have provisions identical to
RICO, Russian fraud and conspiracy causes of action were sufficiently analogous. Further-
more, the court identified Russian law that would support the reversal of judicial acts ob-
tained through corruption as well as related claims under Russian criminal, bankruptcy, and
securities laws. The Court explained that "[a] foreign court need not ... provide the same
procedures as United States courts in order to be considered an adequate forum."61 By
contrast, in HSBC USA, Inc. v. Prosegur Paraguay S.A., the Southern District of New York
refused to dismiss forforum non conveniens because it found Paraguay was not an "adequate
alternative forum. '62 This case arose out of an incident in which about $11 million of
currency was stolen from a shipment transported by the Paraguayan defendants. After not-
ing the significant deference due to the U.S. corporation's choice to sue in its home forum,
the court found that HSBC would likely be unable to obtain basic justice in Paraguay,
noting that a high-level government official was allegedly involved in planning the robbery,
"coordinated and supported by a network of current and ex-governmental, military and
police officials.' 6 The court further noted that Paraguay is ranked the fourth most corrupt
country in the world, that denials of fair trials were common in Paraguay, and that "there
is a 'mafia' that controls the judiciary.' 64 The court thus concluded that the defendant had
not carried its burden of showing that Paraguay was an adequate alternative forum and thus
was not entitled to dismissal on the ground of forum non conveniens.6a
IV. Discovery in International Litigation
A. OBTAINING U.S. DISCOVERY FOR USE IN FOREIGN PROCEEDINGS
Section 1782(a) of tide 28 of the U.S. Code provides that "[t]he district court of the
district in which a person resides or is found may order him to give his testimony or
60. Norex Petroleum Ltd. v. Access Indus., Inc., 304 E Supp. 2d 570 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
61. Id. at 579.
62. HSBC USA, Inc. v. Prosegur Paraguay, S.A., No. 03 Civ. 3336 (LAP), 2004 WL 2210283 (S.D.N.Y
Sept. 30, 2004). See also, In re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 305 ESupp.2d 927 (S.D. Ind. 2004).
63. HSBC USA, 2004 WL 2210283 at *3.
64. Id.
65. Id. at *5.
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statement or to produce a document or other thing for use in a proceeding in a foreign or
international tribunal .... ,"- In Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc.,6 7 the U.S. Su-
preme Court sought to clarify the standards for granting judicial assistance to foreign tri-
bunals under this provision, and resolved a split among the circuits. The question was
whether, as a prerequisite to granting a request for assistance, the evidence being sought
would be "discoverable" under the laws of the foreign country from which the request
emanates.6 The Court rejected that approach, stating that "[s]ection 1782 is a provision
for assistance to tribunals abroad. It does not direct United States courts to engage in
comparative analysis.. ." of foreign law.69 Nevertheless, the Supreme Court also concluded
that "a district court is not required to grant a § 1782(a) discovery application simply be-
cause it has the authority to do so."70 In deciding whether to exercise its discretion to grant
assistance, the court presented with the request may "take into account the nature of the
foreign tribunal, the character of the proceedings underway abroad, and the receptivity of
the foreign government or the court or agency abroad to U.S. federal-court judicial assis-
tance."7' The Supreme Court also held that a "proceeding" before a foreign "tribunal" need
not be "pending" or "imminent" for an applicant to invoke § 1782.72 Rather, the Court
concluded that § 1782 requires "only that a dispositive ruling by the Commission, review-
able by the European courts, be within reasonable contemplation.""
The Supreme Court also addressed the meaning of the term, "tribunal," as used in
§ 1782, holding that the statute can be used to obtain evidence for proceedings not only
before national courts, but also quasi-judicial agencies. 74 In the Intel case, the petitioner
American Micro Devices, sought evidence in connection with an antitrust investigation of
the European Commission.75 One open question is whether § 1782 may be used to obtain
evidence for use in arbitration proceedings. The two circuits that have considered this issue
thus far have interpreted § 1782 restrictively, holding that the statute does not extend to
private arbitration proceedings.76 Although Intel does not directly address this issue, the
Court did quote with approval a scholarly treatise stating that the "term 'tribunal' ... includes
... administrative and arbitral tribunals."" This distinction might cause lower courts to
reconsider the issue of whether § 1782 may be used in aid of arbitration proceedings.
Following the Supreme Court ruling, American Micro Devices renewed its § 1782 ap-
plication in U.S. district court.78 Applying the factors set forth in the Intel decision, the
66. 28 U.S.C. § 1782(a) (2005).
67. Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 124 S. Ct. 2466 (2004).
68. The First, Fifth, and Eleventh Circuits had held that a litigant requesting assistance under § 1782(a)
must demonstrate that the discovery at issue would be available in the foreign jurisdiction; the Second, Third,
and Ninth Circuits had rejected any such requirement. See id. at 2477, n.7.
69. Id. at 2482.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 2483.
72. Id. at 2473.
73. Id. at 2480.
74. Id. at 2479.
75. Id. at 2472.
76. NBC v. Bear Steams & Co., 165 E3d 184 (2d Cir. 1999); Republic of Kazakhstan v. Biedermarm Int'l,
168 E3d 880 (5th Cir. 1999); In re Medway Power Ltd., 985 E Supp. 402 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
77. Intel, 124 S. Ct. at 2479.
78. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. v. Intel Corp., No. C 01-7033, 2004 WL 2282320 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 4,
2004).
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district court declined to grant any assistance, in part because the European Commission
had made it clear in amicus curiae briefs that it did "not need or want" the discovery at
issue.79 The court concluded that the § 1782 application appeared to be "an attempt to
circumvent the EC decision not to pursue such discovery."80 Likewise, in Schmitz v. Bernstein
Liebhard & Lifshitz, LLP, the Second Circuit upheld a district court's denial of discovery in
support of a shareholder action in Germany, largely in recognition that "the German gov-
ernment was obviously unreceptive to the judicial assistance of an American federal court."8
B. THE HAGUE EVIDENCE CONVENTION
The Hague Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial
Matters (Hague Evidence Convention) 2 establishes a treaty mechanism whereby a "judicial
authority" in one contracting state may obtain evidence for use in a "civil or commercial
matter" from any of the other forty-two contracting states to the Convention. 3 The Su-
preme Court's landmark 1987 decision in Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale v. United
States District Court84 settled the issue of whether the Hague Evidence Convention consti-
tutes the exclusive means of obtaining discovery from foreign parties located in a signatory
to the Convention. The Court held that the Hague Evidence Convention is merely a "per-
missive supplement, not a pre-emptive replacement, for other means of obtaining evidence
located abroad" and that first resort to Convention procedures is not required."s
Seventeen years after Aerospatiale, lower courts continue to wrestle with the issue of
whether the Hague Evidence Convention should be used for the purpose of obtaining
discovery to determine whether the court has jurisdiction over a defendant.6 The Aeros-
patiale decision did not reach this issue because jurisdiction was not contested and the
discovery sought involved only the merits of the case. In 2004, the Third Circuit placed
itself firmly in the camp of those courts holding that jurisdictional discovery need not
proceed under the Hague Evidence Convention, stating that the distinction "between 'mer-
its' discovery and 'jurisdictional' discovery, predicated on a false dichotomy of having and
79. Id. at *2.
80. Id. at *3.
81. Schmitz v. Bernstein Liebhard & Lifshitz, LLP, 376 E3d 79 (2d Cit. 2004). Section 1782 applications
were granted, however, in other reported cases. See, e.g., In re Proctor & Gamble Co., 334 E Supp. 2d 1112
(E.D. Wis. 2004) (court granted application by defendant in patent infringement suits pending in the United
Kingdom, France, Netherlands, Germany and Japan); In re Servicio Pan Americano de Proteccion, C.A., 354
E Supp. 2d 269 (S.D.N.Y 2004) (court granted application by Venezuelan security firm for order requiring
bank to produce documents for use in legal proceedings in Venezuela).
82. Taking of Evidence AbroadJuly 27, 1970,23 U.S.T. 2555, 847 U.N.T.S. 23 1.
83. See Glenn P. Hendrix, The Hague Evidence Convention: How is it Really Working? in PRIVATE LAW, PRIVATE
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND JUDICIAL COOPERATION IN THE Eu-U.S. RELATIONSHIP (Ronald Brand ed., forthcom-
ing 2005) (on file with author).
84. Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale v. United States District Court, 428 U.S. 522 (1987).
85. Id. at 536.
86. Compare, In re Vitamins Antitrust Litig., 120 E Supp. 2d 45, 49 (D.D.C. 2000) (jurisdictional discovery
need not proceed under the Hague Evidence Convention); Fishel v. BASF Group, 175 ER.D. 525, 529 (S.D.
Iowa 1997); In re Bedford Computer Corp., 114 B.R. 2, 5-6 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1990); Rich v. Kis Cal., Inc., 121
ER.D. 254, 260 (M.D.N.C. 1988) with Geo-Culture, Inc. v. Siam Inv. Mgmt. S.A., 936 P2d 1063, 1067 (Or.
App. 1997) (ordering first resort to the Hague Convention); Jenco v. Martech Int'l, Inc., Civ. A. No. 86-4229,
1988 WL 54733, at *1 (E.D. La. May 19, 1988); Knight v. Ford Motor Co., 615 A.2d 297, 301 n.ll (NJ.
Super. Ct. 1992).
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not having jurisdiction, amounts to no real difference because the court has jurisdiction for
either type of discovery." 7 A concurring opinion by Judge Jane Roth expressed "concern
that the Hague Convention has been given short shrift since the Supreme Court's decision
[in Aerospatiale]."s8 Roth observed that "[m]any times, rather than wade through the mire
of a complex set of foreign statutes and case law, judges marginalize the Convention as an
unnecessary 'option' .. ." and then urged that "the Aerospatiale decision be reexamined to
ensure that lower courts are in fact exercising 'special vigilance to protect foreign litigants'
and demonstrating respect 'for any sovereign interest expressed by the foreign state."'" 9
Three countries ratified or acceded to the Hague Evidence Convention in 2004-Hun-
gary, Turkey, and The Seychelles. All three entered broad reservations under article 23 of
the Convention, which permits any contracting state to declare that it will not execute a
letter of request issued "for the purpose of obtaining pre-trial discovery of documents as
known in Common Law countries." 90
V. Extraterritorial Application of United States Law
A. INTRODUCTION
Extraterritorial application of United States law is governed by the principles set forth
in the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations that permit a state to exercise prescriptive
jurisdiction where the conduct in question "has or is intended to have substantial effect
within its territory."91 A court seeking to apply a given law extraterritorially must consider
the following factors: (1) the extent of the domestic effect; (2) the connections between the
state and the persons engaging in the conduct in question who seek protection; (3) the
character of the conduct and the extent to which it is regulated elsewhere; (4) the degree
to which justified expectations are protected; (5) the importance of the regulation inter-
nationally; (6) the law's consistency with international custom; (7) the extent of another
state's interest; and (8) the likelihood that extraterritorial application would create a conflict
with the laws of a foreign jurisdiction.9 This determination requires a court to weigh several
domestic and foreign considerations. Domestic considerations include: (1) the nature of the
specific law at issue; (2) congressional intent in establishing that law; and (3) constitutional
limitations. 91 Foreign considerations include issues of comity and fairness. Within the past
year, decisions in this sphere have addressed extraterritoriality in various domains and have
involved issues of presidential power, habeas corpus, criminal actions, tort claims, and vari-
ous statutes concerning antitrust, securities, intellectual property, bankruptcy, immigration,
disabilities, environmental and labor issues.
B. PRESIDENTIAL POWER
Perhaps the most prominent decision this year involved the propriety of the United States
military's action in detaining approximately 640 non-Americans captured abroad at the
87. In re Auto Refinishing Paint Antitrust Litig., 358 E3d 288, 303 (3d Cir. 2004).
88. Id. at 306 (J. Roth, concurring).
89. Id.
90. Taking of Evidence Abroad, supra note 82, at art. 23.
91. Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations § 402(1)(c) (1987).
92. Id. §§ 402-403.
93. See, e.g., Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 819-20 (1993) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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Guantanamo Bay Naval Base. In Rasul v. Bush, 94 petitioners had filed various actions chal-
lenging the legality of their detention at the base, asserting various causes of action including
federal habeas corpus. The D.C. Circuit had previously affirmed dismissal for want of
jurisdiction. The Supreme Court granted certiorari and, on June 28, 2004, reversed and
remanded, holding that the detainees, no less than American citizens, were entitled to
invoke federal habeas relief. In a 5-4 decision (with Justice Kennedy concurring), the Court
held that aliens detained in military custody outside the United States are not categorically
excluded from the privilege of litigation in United States courts. 95 The Court found that
the ordinary presumption against extraterritoriality (that congressional legislation does not
have extraterritorial application unless such intent is clearly manifested) did not apply to
the operation of the habeas statute with respect to persons detained within "the territorial
jurisdiction" of the United States.96 Writing for the majority, Justice Stevens found that by
the express terms of its 1903 lease agreement with Cuba, the United States exercised per-
manent and complete jurisdiction and control over the base. Recognizing the government's
concession that the habeas statute creates jurisdiction over claims by American citizens held
at the base, the Court noted that habeas relief draws no distinction between Americans and
aliens held in federal custody, and that Congress did not intend the geographical coverage
of the statute to vary depending on the detainee's citizenship.97
Several months later, the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia in Al Odab v.
United States,98 held that under the CriminalJustice Act,99 twelve Kuwaiti detainees at Guan-
tanamo Bay were entitled to be represented by counsel while challenging the legality of
their detention.20 The court further held that the government could not abrogate the
detainees' attorney-client privilege by engaging in real-time monitoring of meetings be-
tween the detainees and their counsel, and by conducting "classification review[s]" of any
legal materials either used in those meetings or provided via mail. 101
In another case assessing the extent of presidential power, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit in El-Shifa Pharmaceutical Industries v. United States'02 dis-
missed claims by a Sudanese pharmaceutical company and a Saudi Arabian banker seeking
compensation for the destruction of a manufacturing facility by the U.S. armed forces in
response to the August 7, 1998 terrorist bombings of the United States Embassies in Nai-
robi, Kenya and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. The day after the strikes, President Clinton
stated the United States had acted in self-defense and that the strikes were a necessary and
proportionate response to the imminent threat of further terrorist attacks against U.S.
personnel and facilities. The targets were said to have been selected because they served to
facilitate the efforts of terrorists specifically identified with attacks on American personnel
and facilities and posed a continuing threat to American lives.03 Plaintiffs alleged that the
destruction of the facility constituted a taking of private property for public use within the
94. Rasul v. Bush, 124 S. Ct. 2686 (2004).
95. Id. at 2698-99.
96. Id. at 2696.
97. Id.
98. Al Odah v. United States, 346 E Supp. 2d 1, 5 (D. Col. 2004).
99. 18 U.S.C. § 3006A (2005).
100. Al Odah, 346 F. Supp. 2d at 9.
101. Id.
102. EI-Shifa Pharm. Indus. Co. v. United States, 378 E3d 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
103. Id. at 1349.
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meaning of the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution. The court dismissed
the action because it raised a non-justiciable political question involving the President's
inherent power to designate as enemy property the private property of an alien that was
situated on foreign soil. °4
C. CRIMINAL ACTIONS
Three notable cases involving the extraterritorial application of criminal statutes were
decided in the past year. In Collazos v. United States,'°5 appellant, a Colombian national
indicted on money-laundering charges, challenged a district court determination permitting
the seizure of assets from an account in her name and "disentitling" her to challenge the
seizure based on her refusal to enter the United States to face the related criminal charges.
In affirming, the Second Circuit reiterated the principle most recently cited in United States
v. Yousefthat "Congress is presumed to intend extraterritorial application of criminal statutes
where the nature of the crime does not depend on the locality of the defendants' acts and
where restricting the statute to United States territory would severely diminish the statute's
effectiveness. " 106 In Blancas v. United States, °7 petitioners moved to vacate a twenty-five year
sentence after guilty pleas for the abduction and attempted murder of witnesses who were
to testify at a trial for possession and sale of cocaine and marijuana. Petitioners claimed that
the court had no jurisdiction because the abduction occurred in Mexico. In denying peti-
tioners' applications, the federal district court noted that there is no constitutional bar to
the extraterritorial application of penal laws. 08
Similarly, in United States v. Clark,'°9 defendant pled guilty to two counts of illicit sexual
contact with two Cambodian boys and reserved the right to challenge 18 U.S.C. § 2423(c),
which criminalizes the illicit sexual conduct of United States citizens or admitted aliens
who travel in foreign countries. He moved to dismiss the matter, arguing that the statute
violated international law principles and due process. In denying the motion, the western
district court noted that the judiciary does not give extraterritorial effect to any statute that
violates principles of international law, and that proper extraterritorial application of crim-
inal laws required the government to show a sufficient nexus between the defendant or the
conduct condemned and the United States such that the extraterritorial application of the
statute would not be arbitrary or fundamentally unfair. This nexus requirement served the
same purpose as the minimum contacts test in personal jurisdiction, and ensures that a court
will assert jurisdiction only over a defendant who should reasonably anticipate being haled
into a United States court.
D. TORT CLAIMS
In Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain," o the plaintiff was a Mexican national who appealed the
dismissal of his claim against the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA)
104. Id.
105. Collazos v. United States, 368 E3d 190 (2d Cir. 2004).
106. Id. at 200 (citing United States v. Yousef, 327 F.3d 56, 87 (2d Cir. 2003)).
107. Blancas v. United Status, 344 E Supp. 2d 507 (W.D. Tex. 2004).
108. Id. at 528.
109. United States v. Clark, 315 E Supp. 2d 1127 (W.D. Wash. 2004).
110. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 124 S.Ct. 2739 (2004).
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as well as his claim against a former Mexican policeman under the Alien Tort Claims Act
(ATCA). The claims arose after Mexican nationals, acting on behalf of the Drug Enforce-
ment Agency, kidnapped the plaintiff from Mexico and transported him to the United
States, where he was tried and acquitted of involvement in a DEA agent's murder. The
Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's dismissal of the FTCA claims and affirmed the
ATCA judgment holding the former policeman liable to the plaintiff,"' The Supreme Court
reversed the Ninth Circuit's reinstatement of the plaintiff's claims. The Court held that
since the events involved in the plaintiff's arrest occurred in Mexico, they fell under the
"'foreign country'exception" to the FTCA's waiver of government immunity, which bars
all claims against the government based on injuries suffered in foreign countries irrespective
of where the tortious acts giving rise to that injury occur."'
The history of South African apartheid formed the underlying basis for class action claims
brought in several district courts by representatives of numerous individuals who lived in
South Africa at any time between 1948 and the present and who suffered damages as a
result of the crimes of apartheid. The claims alleged, among other things, that numerous
multinational corporations that did business in apartheid South Africa violated international
law and were subject to suit in U.S. federal court under the Alien Tort Claims Act." 3 These
claims were dismissed. The court held that merely doing business in apartheid South Africa
was not a violation of international law under the ATCA, especially when the United States
had historically relied on economic investment as a means to achieve greater respect for
human rights and a reduction in poverty in developing countries." 4
E. ANTITRUST
F Hoffman-LaRoche v. Ltd Empagran S.A.,"' involved allegations of a worldwide con-
spiracy to raise, stabilize, and maintain vitamin prices. The district court originally granted
the distributor defendants' motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under
the Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act (FTAIA). That statute provides that the
Sherman Act will not apply to conduct involving trade or commerce with foreign nations
unless the conduct affects trade or commerce in the United States in a reasonably foresee-
able, direct, and substantial manner. The D.C. Circuit disagreed with the lower court's
interpretation, opting for a more liberal definition that permits actions where the harmful
effect on U.S. commerce must have given rise to a claim by some other private person or
entity. In an eight to nothing decision (Justice O'Connor not participating), the Supreme
Court vacated the Second Circuit's reversal and remanded." 6 The Court held that the
FTAIAs general rule applied where the anticompetitive conduct at issue was wholly for-
eign."' The Court found that this interpretation was warranted by principles of comity and
that the FTAIAs language and history suggested Congress designed the statute to clarify,
111. Alvarez-Machain v. United States, 331 F.3d 604 (9th Cir. 2003).
112. Sosa, 124 S. Ct. at 2750.
113. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2005).
114. In re South African Apartheid Litig., 346 F Supp..2d 538, 554 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
115. E Hoffman-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 124 S.Ct. 2359 (2004).
116. Id. at 2362, 2372.
117. Id. at 2365-66.
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but not expand in any significant way, the Sherman Act's scope as applied to foreign
commerce.s18
E SECURITIES
The past year has seen several interesting decisions in this sphere. In Poulos v. Caesars
World, Inc., plaintiff patrons sued defendant cruise and land-based casinos for mail fraud,
civil RICO violations, and various other torts, alleging that defendants misled and intended
to induce people to play their video poker and electronic slot machines based on a false
belief concerning how those machines actually operated."9 Some of the alleged fraudulent
conduct occurred in international waters. The lower court denied plaintiffs' class certifi-
cation motion as well as defendants' motions to dismiss. 120 Although the Ninth Circuit
affirmed the denial of class certification, it found that plaintiffs provided a clear connection
between the alleged fraud and United States interests.' The court also noted that while
RICO itself is silent as to its extraterritorial application
tests used to assess the extraterritorial application of the securities laws provide useful guide-
lines for evaluating whether the jurisdictional minimum exists- particularly in cases such as
this one, where comity concerns arising out of a foreign government's interest in the action
are too peripheral to impact our threshold jurisdictional inquiry. 2
The opposite result ensued in OSRecovery, Inc. v. One Groupe International, Inc., 3 There,
plaintiffs were domestic and foreign individual investors and account holders alleging RICO
claims against Latvian banks. 124 The district court dismissed the foreign plaintiffs' RICO
claims, finding that it was "unlikely that Congress intended for federal courts to devote
precious resources to claims based on foreign injuries resulting from a foreign company's
foreign conduct. To hold otherwise would be to extend RICO liability over the world."' 2'
But the court did note that while RICO was silent as to extraterritorial application, "it is
well-settled that foreign entities are not immune from RICO liability on the basis of their
citizenship. But 'less clear is the character and amount of activity in the United States that
will justify RICO subject matter jurisdiction over a foreign entity.'" 2 6
Similarly, in Nuevo Mundo Holdings v. Pricewaterhouse Coopers LLP, the Southern District
again dismissed RICO claims brought by shareholders and directors of a Panamanian
bank against a Peruvian former superintendent of banking and insurance, alleging con-
spiracy to seize control of Nuevo Mundo. 27 The plaintiffs also alleged that U.S. defen-
dants PriceWaterhouse and Arthur Andersen were responsible for the conduct of their
respective Peruvian affiliates and officials. 28 The court held that inasmuch as all of the
118. Id. at 2366-67.
119. Poulos v. Caesars World, Inc., 379 F3d 654, 659-60 (9th Cir. 2004).
120. Id. at 659, 668.
121. Id. at 664.
122. Id. at 663.
123. OSRecovery, Inc. v. One Groupe International, Inc., et al., 354 E Supp. 2d 357 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
124. Id. at 360.
125. Id. at 367.
126. Id. at 365-66.
127. Nuevo Mundo Holdings v. Pricewaterhouse Coopers LLP, No. 03 Civ. 0613, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
24900 (S.D.N.Y Dec. 8, 2004).
128. Id.
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material alleged conduct occurred in Peru, and affected mostly Peruvian shareholders
and directors, this was not the type of action in which United States resources should be
devoted.t2 9
G. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
In a further example of the ways in which technology is sculpting issues of extraterrito-
riality, the Canadian creators of the successful BlackBerry wireless email device, Research
In Motion, recently announced their intention to appeal a patent dispute to the United
States Supreme Court, and the Canadian government indicated it would support the ef-
fort.13° The announcement was in response to a December 14, 2004, Federal Circuit de-
cision in favor of plaintiff NTP, Inc., a domestic patent holder in NTP, Inc. v. Research In
Motion, Ltd. 1 The decision vacated and remanded a district court order entering judgment
in favor of the patent holder following a jury verdict finding that defendant's system infringed
the holder's patents, awarded damages, and permanently enjoined further infringement. 132
On appeal, Research In Motion argued that infringement under 25 U.S.C.S. § 271(a)
could only stand if all of the allegedly infringing activity occurred within the United
States."' Since a component of the wireless system, the BlackBerry relay component (which
Research In Motion described as the "control point" of the system), was located in Canada,
the statute did not apply, even if the use and function of the system occurred in the United
States. 34 The Court of Appeals disagreed, holding that "when two domestic users com-
municate via their BlackBerry devices, their use of the BlackBerry system occurs 'within
the United States,' regardless of whether the messages exchanged between them may be
transmitted outside of the United States at some point along their wireless journey." 3"
Readers are encouraged to "stay tuned" to their wireless devices for news as to whether the
Supreme Court will grant certiorari.
H. BANKRUPTCY
In French v. Liebmann, a debtor's children appealed a bankruptcy court decision granting
a Chapter Seven trustee's summary judgment motion on a constructively fraudulent transfer
claim." 6 The debtor's children sought to avoid a pre-petition transfer of the debtor's prop-
erty located in the Bahamas for the benefit of the bankruptcy estate.'37 The district court
affirmed the bankruptcy court's decision, holding that the Bankruptcy Code applies extra-
territorially when needed to effectuate its principal goals of asset preservation and equitable
distribution to creditors."' The district court also affirmed the bankruptcy court's finding
129. Id., at *12.
130. Ian Austen, In Suit, BlackBerry Maker Pleads Canadian, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 24, 2005, at C4; Press Release,
Beth Duff-Brown, Canada Steps in on Blackberry Patent Row (Jan. 27, 2005), available at http://www.information
weekcom/shared/printable.ArticleSrc.jhtml?articlelD = 57704074.
131. NTP, Inc. v. Research In Motion, Ltd., 392 E3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
132. Id. at 1367-68.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 1367.
135. Id. at 1368.
136. French v. Liebmann, 320 B.R. 78 (D. Md. 2004).
137. Id. at 80-81.
138. Id. at 81.
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that international comity concerns were insufficient to withhold action because the allegedly
fraudulent transfer took place in the forum state and all of the persons with an interest in
the property were U.S. residents." 9
I. IMMIGRATION
In United States v. Delgado-Garcia,14 defendants were arrested in the port of Quetzal,
Guatemala after their vessel was located in international waters off the coast of Guatemala
and Mexico. Defendants eventually pled guilty to conspiring to transport 191 Ecuadorian
nationals to facilitate their illegal entry into the United States. Nonetheless, defendants
challenged the extraterritorial application of 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a), which prohibits such con-
duct. The D.C. Circuit affirmed the lower court's conviction, holding that the statute
necessarily applied extraterritorially.41 The court reasoned that since border control mea-
sures were crucial to national security and foreign policy, and since the statute proscribed
"'attempts to bring' aliens 'to the United States' [and m]any incomplete attempts [would]
occur outside the territorial jurisdiction of the United States, . . . [ilt is natural to expect




The court considered whether the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compen-
sation, and Liability Act (CERCLA)14' applied extraterritorially, so as to permit a directive
to remedially investigate a smelter located in Canada, ten miles north of the United States-
Canada border. In Pakootas v. Teck Cominco Metals, Ltd., Native American tribe members
sued to enforce an Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) Unilateral Administrative Or-
der for Remedial Investigation/Feasibility Study" 44 In denying the defendants' motion to
dismiss, the court noted that CERCLA did not distinguish between foreign and domestic
individuals or corporations. 4 The court adhered to the Ninth Circuit's characterization
that "if Congressional intent ... cannot be divined, then courts will examine additional
factors to determine whether the traditional presumption against extraterritorial application
should be disregarded in a particular case."'' l The court then noted that in passing CER-
CLA, Congress clearly intended to remedy domestic conditions. 47 It also noted that the
general presumption against extraterritoriality does not apply where foreign conduct results
in adverse effects within the United States.14 Recognizing that CERCLA defined "envi-
ronment" as limited to waters, land and air under the jurisdiction of the United States, the
139. Id. at 86.
140. United States v. Delgado-Garcia, 374 E3d 1337 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
141. Id.
142. Id. at 1347; id. at 1345.
143. 42 U.S.C. § 9601 (2005).
144. Pakootas v. Teck Cominco Metals, Ltd., No. CV-04-256-AAM, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23041 (E.D.
Wash. Nov. 8, 2004).
145. Id. at *50-51.
146. Id. at *22.
147. Id. at *27-28.
148. Id.
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court held that CERCLA applied to regulate the Canadian company's conduct because
such conduct resulted in substantial effects within the United States. 149
K. LABOR STANDARDS
Two courts recently held that the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) I5 ° and the Fair
Labor Standards Act (FLSA)l5' did not apply extraterritorially. In Asplundh Tree Expert Co.
v. NLRB, the NLRB determined that a Cincinnati employer violated the NLRA by threat-
ening to lay off one employee and discharging two employees in response to complaints
about working conditions while on a temporary work assignment in Ottawa, Canada.'52
The Third Circuit vacated the NLRB finding, noting that because Congress did not provide
a method for resolving conflicts with other nations' labor laws, the presumption against
extraterritoriality applied. 5 The same result ensued in Smith v. Raytheon Co., where the
plaintiffs sought overtime compensation for their work supporting defendant's contract
with the National Science Foundation.5 4 The U.S. district court held that because the
FLSA did not apply to work performed in a "foreign country," and because Antarctica was
a "foreign country," the defendant was not required to furnish the additional benefits
sought.'
VI. Recent Developments in the Service of Process Abroad
.A. INTRODUCTION
In federal courts, the service of process outside the United States in civil actions is gov-
erned by Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.'5 6 In state courts, the particular
procedures of the forum state apply. In either case, when there is occasion to transmit
documents "for service abroad" to a foreign state that is a signatory to the Hague Conven-
tion on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents (Hague Convention
on Service),' the Supreme Court has directed that the Convention provides the exclusive
means for effecting service on the territory of a signatory state.5 8 Where service on a foreign
149. Id.
150. 29 U.S.C. § 158 (2005).
151. Id. § 213.
152. Asplundh Tree Expert Co. v. Nat'l Labor Relations Board, 365 E3d 168 (3d Cir. 2004).
153. Id. at 180.
154. Smith v. Raytheon Co., 297 ESupp.2d 399 (D. Mass. 2004).
155. Id. at 403.
156. There are two rules of Federal Civil Procedure that apply to service of process upon an international
entity located outside of the United States: FED. R. Civ. P. 4(f) governs service upon individuals in a foreign
country, while FED. R. Civ. P. 4(h) governs service of process upon corporations and associations. In addition,
service of process on foreign states and their agencies and instrumentalities must generally be effected in
accordance with the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act. 28 U.S.C. § 1608 (2003).
157. Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents, Nov. 15, 1965, 20 U.S.T. 361 [hereinafter
Hague Convention on Service]. Article 1 of the Hague Convention on Service defines the scope of the con-
vention as follows: "[tlhe present Convention shall apply in all cases, in civil or commercial matters, where
there is occasion to transmit a judicial or extrajudicial document for service abroad." Id. at art. 1.
158. Volkswagenwerk AG v. Schlunk, 486 U.S. 694, 705 (1988) (holding that "compliance with the Con-
vention is mandatory in all cases to which it applies .... ).
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party may be effected in the United States without the need for service abroad, the Supreme
Court has held that the Hague Convention on Service is not applicable.5 9
B. SERVICE BY MAIL UNDER ARTICLE 10(a) OF THE HAGUE CONVENTION ON SERVICE
One issue that continues to cause disagreement among federal and state courts is whether
article 10(a) of the Hague Convention on Service, preserving "the freedom to send judicial
documents, by postal channels, directly to persons abroad," 6° authorizes the service of
judicial documents by mail, or whether it merely authorizes the mailing of documents other
than process. In 2004, in Cupp v. Alberto-Culver USA, Inc.,161 a district court in Tennessee
held that article 10(a) does not authorize service of process by mail. Noting the split of
authority among the federal courts as to whether article 10(a) allows service of process
abroad by mail, and that the Sixth Circuit has not yet passed on this issue, the court followed
the lead of district courts in the circuit, holding that, were the issue squarely presented to
the circuit court, it would "likely hold" that service by mail does not comport with the
requirements of the Hague Convention on Service.
62
In contrast, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals sided with the Second Circuit in holding
that service by mail is permitted under article 10(a) of the Hague Convention. 163 In Brock-
meyer v. May,IM the court held that "the meaning of 'send' in Article 10(a) includes 'serve,"'
as this reading "is consistent with the purpose of the Convention to facilitate international
service of judicial documents." 16
C. SERVICE MUST CONFORM WITH THE APPLICABLE REQUIREMENTS OF THE RECEIVING
COUNTRY AND WITH THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURES
The Hague Convention on Service affirmatively requires each member country to des-
iguate a Central Authority to receive documents from another member country.- The
primary means by which service is accomplished is through the receiving country's Central
Authority. The receiving country can impose certain requirements with respect to those
documents. If their requirements are met, the Convention affirmatively requires the Central
Authority to effect service.' But if the documents do not comply with those requirements,
the Central Authority may refuse to effect service. 68
159. Id.
160. Hague Convention on Service, supra note 157 (emphasis added). Article 10(a) of the Hague Convention
on Service provides in pertinent part: "[p]rovided the State of destination does not object, the present Con-
vention shall not interfere with (a) the freedom to send judicial documents, by postal channels, directly to
persons abroad..." Id.
161. Cupp v. Alberto Culver USA, Inc., 308 E Supp. 2d 873 (W.D. Tenn. 2004).
162. Id. at 880. See also Bankston v. Toyota Motor Corp., 889 E2d 172, 173-74 (8th Cir. 1989) (holding that
the meaning of the word "send" in article 10(a) does not include "serve"; that is, it held that "send" permitted
the sending of judicial documents by mail, but only after service of process was accomplished by some other
means).
163. Brockmeyer v. May, 383 E3d 798 (9th Cir 2004); see Ackermann v. Levine, 788 E2d 830, 838 (2d Cir.
1986).
164. Brockmeyer, 383 F.3d at 798.
165. Id. at 802.
166. Hague Convention on Service, supra note 157, at art. 2.
167. Id. at arts. 4-5.
168. Id. at art. 4 ("If the Central Authority considers that the request does not comply with the provisions
of the present Convention it shall promptly inform the applicant and specify its objections to the request.").
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While one court this year has demanded strict compliance with the law of the foreign
country for service in that country, another court has held that strict compliance is not
required.169 Article 5 of the Hague Convention on Service allows signatory nations to re-
quire any summons and complaint that is served within their jurisdiction to be translated
into the native language.7 0 In American River Transportation Co. v. M/V Bow Lion,171 the
court considered whether service of a summons and complaint on K.P. Chemical, a Korean
corporation, was proper where an un-translated summons and complaint were mailed to
the defendant in Korea. 172 The court began with the proposition that "[ulse of the Hague
Convention [on Service] procedures, when available, is mandatory if the documents must
be transmitted abroad to effect service,"' 73 and then went on to hold that service was not
properly effectuated where the pleadings had not been translated into Korean.
7 4
On the other hand, in Burda Media, Inc. v. Blumenberg,75 the Southern District of New
York held that actual notice, as opposed to rigid formalism, is the key factor. Burda arranged
for service of the summons and complaint translated into French through France's desig-
nated Central Authority, the Ministry of Justice. 7 6 Police reports confirmed that French
Police Judiciare Officers personally served defendant Viertele at his home in Cap Ferrat,
France. 77 French authorities, however, did not provide Burda with an executed "Certificate"
indicating that Viertele had been properly served.17 The court noted that while the Con-
vention requires completion of the Certificate, the Certificate should have contained the
information in the appended police report. The court stated that
[t]he failure to comply strictly with the requirements of the Hague Convention is not auto-
matically fatal to effective service. "The Hague Convention carefully articulates the procedure
which a litigant must follow in order to perfect service abroad, but it does not prescribe the
procedure for the forum Court to follow should an element of procedure fail." In light of this
fact, ... faced with such a situation, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which "stress[]
actual notice, rather than strict formalism," should be applied in such a situation. 7 9
Service abroad must conform not only to the requirements of the Hague Convention on
service, but also to either the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or the applicable state rules.
As the Rapporteur for the Convention wrote in explaining Article 10(a), "[I]t should be stressed
that in permitting the utilization of postal channels,... the draft convention did not intend to
169. Compare American River Transp. Co. v. M/V Bow Lion, No. 03-1306, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5952
(E.D. La. Apr. 6, 2004), with Burda Media, Inc. v. Blumberg, 97 Civ. 7167, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8804
(S.D.N.Y. May 18, 2004).
170. Hague Convention on Service, supra note 157, at art 5.
171. American River Transp. Co., 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5952.
172. The Court first rejected plaintiff's argument that service on the attorney appearing for a subrogated
insurer of the defendant in New Orleans, in English and without translation, was proper, and obviated the
need for a translation since the subrogee could not have greater rights than the subrogor. Id. at *6-8.
173. Id. at *6.
174. Id. at *6, 9-10.
175. Burda Media, Inc., 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8804.
176. Id. at *5.
177. Id. at *7.
178. Id. at *9.
179. Id. at *17-18 (internal citations omitted).
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pass on the validity of this mode of transmission under the law of the forum state: in orderfor
the postal channel to be utilized, it is necessary that it be authorized by the law of the forum state. "ISO
Thus, "[a]ny affirmative authorization of service by international mail, and any require-
ments as to how that service is to be accomplished, must come from the law of the forum
in which the suit is filed."' In Brockmeyer v. May, 82 after determining that service com-
ported with the requirements of the Hague Convention on Service, the court undertook
an analysis of whether service was proper under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The
court found that Rule 4(f)(1) did not authorize service as plaintiff had not utilized either
the Central Authority or any other internationally agreed means for accomplishing ser-
vice.' Furthermore Rule 4(f)(2)(C)(ii), the only provision explicitly authorizing service by
international mail when a signed receipt is required and such mail is addressed by the
appropriate district court clerk, did not allow for adequate service since the court clerk did
not send the summons and complaint. 84 Similarly, court ordered alternative service meth-
ods under Rule 4(f)(3) did not authorize service as plaintiff did not "obtain prior court
approval."' And lastly, Rule 4(f)(2)(A), authorizing service by means used in the receiving
country for service in an action in its courts of general jurisdiction does not include service
by mail. I s6 Thus, despite overcoming the hurdles of service abroad required under the
Convention, service was still improper. Thus, to err on the side of caution, practitioners
who are not familiar with the requirements of the country receiving process are advised to
retain a company specializing in service of civil process abroad." 7
D. DELIVERY TO CENTRAL AUTHORITY FOR STATUTE OF LIMITATIoNs PURPOSES
In ParacelsusHealthcare Corp. v. Philips Medical Systems, Nederland, B. V,18 plaintiff brought
a breach of warranty action against Philips Medical, a Dutch company. The amended com-
plaint and related documents were delivered to the Central Authority in the Netherlands
one month prior to the expiration of the statute of limitations, but were not served on
Philips until almost two months after the Central Authority received the complaint, one
month past the expiration of the statute of limitations.8 9 In affirming the district court's
grant of summary judgment for defendant based on the statute of limitations, the court
held that delivery to the Central Authority neither completed service under the relevant
North Dakota statutes, nor tolled the statute of limitations. In rejecting Plaintiff's argument
that they lost control over when service would occur once the papers were delivered to the
Central Authority, the court noted that the Netherlands allowed for alternative methods of
service other than through the Central Authority.190




184. Id. at 804-05.
185. Id. at 806.
186. Id.
187. Paracelsus Healthcare Corp. v. Philips Med. Sys., Nederland, B.V., 384 E3d 492, 494 (8th Cir. 2004)
(noting that service was effectuated through a company specializing in service of process on foreign defendants);
In re Teligent, Inc., No. 02-56823, 2004 Bankr. LEXIS 337, at *5 n.2 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Aug. 31, 2004).
188. Paracelsus, 384 E3d at 492.
189. Id. at 494.
190. Id. at 497.
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E. NEW SIGNATORIES TO THE HAGUE CONVENTION
In 2004 Romania entered into the Hague Convention on Service.' 9' Hungary ratified the
Convention in 2004, and it became effective in April of 2005.192
VII. Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards
A. INTRODUCTION
The U.N. Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards
(New York Convention) governs the recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards
in U.S. courts.193 The New York Convention applies to awards "made in the territory of a
[signatory] State other than the State where the recognition and enforcement ... [is]
sought" and to awards considered to be non-domestic. 94 In this year's case developments,
U.S. courts continued rejecting objections to enforcement under the public policy exception
of the Convention, deferred to foreign courts where appropriate, and in one reported case
denied confirmation outright.
B. CASE LAw DEVELOPMENTS
1. Decisions on Matters of First Impression
In two separate cases, the Second Circuit addressed the unresolved question of whether
confirmation of a foreign arbitral award requires the parties' prior consent. In Phoenix
Aktiengesellschaft v. Ecoplas, Inc., 95 the Second Circuit affirmed the decision to confirm an
award, holding that the consent-to-confirmation requirement of section 9 of the Federal
Arbitration Act (FAA) was preempted by the less restrictive confirmation provision appli-
cable under the New York Convention. Section 9 of the FAA, the confirmation provision
of Chapter One, requires prior consent to confirmation by both parties. 96 In Chapter Two,
which implements the New York Convention, FAA section 207 requires no such consent.197
Because section 9 expressly forbids confirmation in cases where section 207 authorizes such
confirmation, the court concluded that the two provisions conflict. 19 Under the FAA, the
191. Hague Conference on Private International Law, Hague Convention on Service Status Table, at http://
hccb.e-vision.n/index-en.php?act = conventions.status&cid= 17(last updated May 12, 2005).
192. Id.
193. U.N. Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, June 10, 1958, 21
U.S.T 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 38, [hereinafter New York Convention] (entered into force for the United States
Dec. 29, 1970, subject to declarations implemented by 9 U.S.C. §§ 201-208 (2005)).
194. Id. art. I(I). The United States ratified the Convention subject to the reservations that it applies only
to (i) awards made in the territory of a Convention signatory, and (ii) disputes arising out of commercial
relationships. See 9 U.S.C. § 202.
195. Phoenix Aktiengesellschaft v. Ecoplas, Inc., 391 E3d 433 (2d Cir. 2004).
196. Section 9 of the FAA reads, in pertinent part, " []f the parties in their agreement have agreed that ajudgrment
of the court shall be entered upon the award made pursuant to the arbitration, and shall specify the court, then at any
time within one year after the award is made any party to the arbitration may apply to the court so specified
for an order confirming the award..." 9 U.S.C. § 9 (1947) (emphasis added).
197. Section 207 of the FAA provides, in pertinent part, that "[w]ithin three years after an arbitral award
falling under the Convention is made, any party to the arbitration may apply to any court having jurisdiction
under this chapter for an order confirming the award as against any other party to the arbitration." 9 U.S.C.
§ 207 (1970).
198. Phoenix Aktiengesellschaft, 391 F3d at 436.
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pre-Convention provisions of Chapter One apply to the enforcement of foreign arbitral
awards except to the extent that Chapter One conflicts with Chapter Two of the Conven-
tion.199 Accordingly, the court held that section 207 preempts the restrictive consent-to-
confirmation requirement of section 9 in cases that fall within the ambit of the Convention.s°°
The Second Circuit addressed another matter of first impression in Compagnie Noga
D'Importation et D'Exportation, S.A. v. Russian Federation20 In Compagnie Noga, the court
considered "whether a federal court will confirm a foreign arbitration award against a sov-
ereign nation, where one of the sovereign's political organs was a party to the arbitration
.... "202 Answering in the affirmative, the Second Circuit vacated and remanded the district
court's unpublished decision denying Noga's motion to confirm a Swedish arbitral award.
In 1990, Noga entered into supply contracts with the trade agency of the USSR and that
of a constituent republic of the USSR, predecessor to the Russian Federation. To ensure
partial financing for its supply contracts with the state-owned trade agencies, Noga also
entered into loan agreements with the government of the constituent republic and later
with the government of the Russian Federation. The agreements provided for binding
arbitration in the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce. °3 When a dispute arose regarding
performance of the agreements, Noga filed an arbitration request, and named the Russian
Federation as the respondent. The Russian Federation did not respond. Rather, attorneys
appearing for the Federation objected and requested that Noga be required to name as
respondents the government and state agencies that had signed the relevant contracts.
Throughout the eight-year arbitration, the government, and not the Russian Federation,
arbitrated with Noga. The arbitrators never ruled on the Federation's objection, and Noga
never sought recourse to the courts to compel the Russian Federation's participation in the
arbitration.2°4
The U.S. district court denied Noga's motion to confirm an arbitral award in its favor,
concluding that the Russian Federation was a separate entity from the government, and
that the former had not been a party to the Swedish arbitration.2 °5 On Noga's appeal, the
Second Circuit vacated the district court's opinion, holding that the Russian Federation
and government were not separate "parties" for the purpose of confirming an arbitral award
under the New York Convention. 06
2. Enforcement Over Objections on Public Policy Grounds
Courts continued the unvarying U.S. practice of rejecting award debtors' objections to
confirmation based on the public policy exception of article V(2)(b).207 In three cases, the
199. Id. at 435. See also 9 U.S.C. § 208 (1970).
200. Phoenix Aktiengesellschaft, 391 E3d at 435. The Second Circuit reached the same result in an unpub-
lished summary order issued in Stone & Webster, Inc. v. Triplefine Int'l Corp., No. 03-9082(L), 2004 WL 2940799
(2d Cir. 2004).
201. Compagnie Noga D'Importation et D'Exportation S.A. v. Russian Federation, 361 E3d 676 (2d Cir.
2004).
202. Id. at 686.
203. Id. at 679.
204. Id.
205. See id. at 682-83.
206. Id. at 690.
207. Article V(2)(b) of the Convention allows for refusal or deferral of recognition and enforcement of
foreign arbitral awards in cases in which "the competent authority in the country where recognition and
enforcement is sought finds that... [t]he recognition and enforcement of the award would be contrary to the
public policy of that country." New York Convention, supra note 193, at art. V(2)(b).
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courts found no public policy was at issue.20 8 In a fourth case, Karen Maritime Ltd. v. Omar
International Incorporation., the court identified opposition to the Arab boycott of Israel as
an "explicit public policy, well defined and dominant, as may be ascertained by reference
to the United States Code."' 9 Specifically, the court cited an anti-boycott law that prohib-
ited Americans from refusing to do business with Israel or providing information about any
Israeli ownership of their businesses. Omar invoked the policy to avoid confirmation of an
arbitral award in favor of Karen Maritime. The parties' twenty-year-old agreement com-
mitting them to arbitration included a clause requiring assurances that in the performance
of the contract the vessels used would not be Israeli-owned, nor would they land at Israeli
ports. In signing a contract demanding such assurances, arbitral award debtor Omar likely
violated the anti-boycott law.2'0 While the court suggested non-confirmation on public
policy grounds might well have been appropriate had the award been based on a breach of
contract involving the Arab boycott, the court concluded that the "obnoxious clause.., in
no way forms the basis of the arbitral award." 2 " Additionally, the court found that award
debtor Omar "lacks clean hands," not having previously raised legal, moral or patriotic
objections to the agreement's illegal clause.2 12 Noting the inequity in allowing Omar to
avoid the consequences of the arbitral award, the court granted the motion to confirm the
award.
3. Deference to Foreign Court Review
In at least three cases this year, courts deferred or denied confirmation of foreign arbitral
awards in deference to a foreign court's review of challenges to the propriety of proceeding
in arbitration or the awards themselves.
In Four Seasons Hotels and Resorts, B. V v. Consorcio Barr S.A.,2' 3 the Eleventh Circuit
remanded the case for consideration of the effect of a Venezuelan court ruling prohibiting
arbitration of the parties' dispute.' The parties entered into an agreement governed by
Venezuelan law whereby Consorcio built a hotel in Venezuela that was to be operated by
Four Seasons.' Disputes arose nearly from the start and Four Seasons commenced arbi-
tration in Miami. In both the arbitration and in litigation initiated in Venezuela, Consorcio
sought to have the arbitration declared improper. In the arbitration, the panel issued a
partial award requiring Consorcio to submit to arbitration and withdraw its Venezuelan
litigation. The Venezuelan court, however, declared that the parties' disputes were not
208. See Karaha Bodas Co., L.L.C. v. Perusahaan Pertambangan Minyak Dan Gas Bumi Negara, 364 E3d
274, 306-07 (5th Cir. 2004) (rejecting claims that international law doctrine of abuse of rights and the failure
to disclose existence of political risk insurance provided basis for public policy exception to enforcement), cert.
denied, 125 S.Ct. 59 (Oct. 4, 2004); MGM Prods. Group, Inc. v. Aeroflot Russian Airlines, 91 Fed. Appx. 716,
718 (2d Cir. 2004) (unpublished) (finding it doubtful that the agreement at issue violated regulations barring
trade with Iran, and therefore holding arbitral award compensating plaintiff for breach of the agreement "cannot
be said to violate fundamental public policy"); Stawski Distrib. Co., Inc. v. Zywiec Breweries, PLC, No. 02 C
8708, 2004 WL 2222277 (N.D. Il1. 2004) (rejecting award debtor's claims that arbitrators' application of Polish,
rather than Illinois, law provided basis for non-enforcement under Convention's public policy exception).
209. Karen Maritime Ltd. v. Omar Int'l Inc., 322 E Supp. 2d 224, 229 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Id. at 230.
213. Four Seasons Hotels and Resorts, B.V v. Consorcio Barr S.A., 377 F3d 1164 (1 th Cir. 2004).
214. Id. at 1171-72.
215. Id. at 1165.
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within their agreement to arbitrate, and therefore, arbitration of the disputes was improper
under Venezuelan law.' 16 Four Seasons sought judicial confirmation of the arbitral award
in the Southern District of Florida. Finding that Consorcio's participation in the arbitration
precluded its opposition to confirmation, the court confirmed the partial award."7
On Consorcio's appeal, the Eleventh Circuit addressed whether the parties' disputes
should proceed before the arbitral panel or the Venezuelan courts. Accepting that partici-
pation in the arbitration did not preclude a challenge to the partial arbitral award that
directed the parties to arbitrate, the Eleventh Circuit vacated and remanded the case, directing
the district court to consider whether the Venezuelan ruling favors non-confirmation under
article V(l)(a) of the Convention. 2 8 The court noted, first, that even if article V(l)(a) applies,
an arbitral award may be confirmed at the discretion of the district court and, second, that
the district court may consider staying the confirmation proceedings pending the outcome
of the Four Season's appeal of the Venezuelan decision prohibiting arbitration.2"9
In Telcordia Technologies, Inc. v. Telkom SA, Ltd.,225 the D.C. Circuit upheld the dismissal
without prejudice of Telcordia's petition for enforcement of a South African arbitral award
against Telkom. The district court had based its dismissal onforum non conveniens and lack
of personal jurisdiction. On appeal, the D.C. Circuit, in affirming the dismissal without
prejudice based on article VI of the Convention, found it unnecessary to address those
issues. It observed that article VI of the Convention allows for adjournment of an award
enforcement decision if an application for setting aside the award has been made to a
competent authority.2"' Telkom had made such an application to the High Court of South
Africa. After Telcordia had appealed the district court's dismissal of the motion for confir-
mation, the South African court in fact set aside the award, a decision that Telcordia stated
it intended to appeal.
In In re Arbitration Between International Bechtel Co. & Department of Civil Aviation of the
Government ofDubai2 2 a decision on Bechtel's petition for confirmation of an arbitral award
issued under Dubai law was stayed pending the outcome of litigation before Dubai's highest
court over the propriety of oaths taken by witnesses in the arbitration. Bechtel had entered
into a construction contract with the Department of Civil Aviation of the Government of
Dubai (DCA). In accordance with the contract, the parties resorted to arbitration to resolve
Bechtel's claim of nonpayment and DCA's counterclaim for breach. The sole arbitrator
awarded Bechtel over $24 million, dismissing DCA's counterclaim. DCA's failure to satisfy
the award prompted Bechtel's confirmation petition in the Dubai courts. Dubai's lower
courts overturned the arbitral award on the ground that the witnesses in the arbitration had
not taken oaths in the form prescribed by Dubai law, rejecting arguments that DCA's failure
to object to the oaths during the arbitration constituted its waiver of that ground for refusing
216. Id. at 1166.
217. Id.
218. Id. at 1171. Under Article V(1)(a) enforcement may be refused upon proof that the "agreement is not
valid under the law to which the parties have subjected it or, failing any indication thereon, under the law of
the country where the award was made .... " New York Convention, supra note 193, at art. V()(a).
219. Id. at 1172.
220. Telcordia Techs., Inc. v. Telkom SA, Ltd., 95 Fed. Appx. 361 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (unpublished).
221. Id. at 363.
222. In re Arbitration Between Int'l Bechtel Co. Ltd. and Dep't of Civil Aviation of the Gov't of Dubai, 300
F. Supp. 2d 112 (D.D.C. 2004).
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confirmation.223 While Bechtel's appeal of the refusal to confirm the award remained pend-
ing in Dubai, Bechtel petitioned for confirmation in the D.C. court and in France. The
D.C. district court held it had subject matter jurisdiction under the commercial activities
or arbitration awards exceptions of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act,224 but that prin-
ciples of comity dictated that its decision on confirmation await the result of Bechtel's appeal
in Dubai.22 Accordingly, the court sua sponte stayed the proceedings pending the outcome
of Bechtel's appeal in Dubai or the French confirmation proceedings.226
The Fifth Circuit properly declined to defer to an Indonesian court's annulment of an
arbitral award in Karaba Bodas Co. L.L. C. v. Pernsahaan Pertambangan Minyak Dan Gas Bumi
Negara.227 The award resulted from an arbitration in Geneva of disputes arising out of
two contracts for the production by KBC of electricity in Indonesia for Pertamina, an
Indonesian-owned company.22 Indonesia's financial crisis prompted it to suspend the pro-
ject indefinitely, and KBC initiated arbitration. The arbitral tribunal found in favor of KBC,
and Pertamina appealed to the Swiss Supreme Court. While that appeal was pending, KBC
sought to enforce the arbitral award in U.S. federal district court. In deference to Pertam-
ina's request that the Swiss court first be allowed to consider whether to annul the award,
the district court slowed its enforcement proceedings.229 The Swiss court refused the request
for annulment and the U.S. district court enforced the award. Subsequently, Pertamina
obtained annulment of the award from an Indonesian court.230 On appeal, the Fifth Circuit
rejected Pertamina's claims that the Indonesian annulment should be given effect. Swit-
zerland was the situs of the arbitration and Swiss law governed the arbitration. Therefore,
primary jurisdiction, under which the award could be annulled, rested with the Swiss courts.2 1'
Indonesia had only secondary jurisdiction over the award. Accordingly, the Indonesian court's
annulment ruling was not a defense to enforcement under the Convention.232
4. Confirmation Denied Outright
In addition to cases in which U.S. courts deferred, the Eleventh Circuit upheld a lower
court's decision that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction to confirm an award in Czarina,
L.L.C. v. WE Poe Syndicate.33 The court held that a party seeking confirmation of a foreign
arbitral award must comply with the Convention's agreement-in-writing requirement to
establish jurisdiction under the Convention.3 4 Award creditor Czarina had initiated arbi-
tration as an assignee of a reinsurance agreement, which the original parties had failed to
reduce to a signed writing. Over Poe's persistent objections, the arbitral panel decided that
the parties had agreed to arbitrate their dispute. Citing China Minmetals Materials Import
223. Id. at 114-15.
224. Id. at 116-17.
225. Id. at 117.
226. Id. at 118.
227. Karaha Bodas, 364 E3d at 282.
228. Id.
229. Id. at 285.
230. Id. at 285-86.
231. Id. at 310.
232. Id.
233. Czarina, L.L.C. v. WF. Poe Syndicate, 358 F.3d 1286, 1289 (1 lth Cir. 2004).
234. Id. at 1292.
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& Export Co. v. Chi Mei Corp., 35 the Eleventh Circuit concurred in the district court's view
that judicial examination of whether the parties had agreed to arbitrate the issue of arbitr-
ability was proper. 36 The court also upheld a determination that the parties had not agreed
to arbitrate, despite the arbitral tribunal's finding to the contrary. Finally, the court rejected
award creditor Czarina's arguments that Poe's participation in the merits of the arbitration
relieved Czarina of its burden to establish the Convention's jurisdictional prerequisites had
been met. The court distinguished two award-confirmation cases that bypassed the juris-
dictional requirements of article IV of the Convention by noting Poe objected early and
often to the arbitration.23
7
235. China Minmetals Materials Import & Export Co. v. Chi Mei Corp., 334 E3d 274 (3d Cir. 2003)
(highlighted in the 2004 review).
236. Czarina, 358 E3d at 1293.
237. Id. at 1294 (distinguishing Slaney v. Int'lAmateurAtbletic Fed'n, 244 F.3d 580, 591 (7th Cir. 2001) and
Al Haddad Bros. Enters., Inc. v. MISAgapi, 635 ESupp. 205, 209 (D. Del. 1986)).
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